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ABSTRACT 
Audit markets are highly concentrated and such a situation might have 
negative consequences on competition, and thus, on price setting, on audit 
quality and on the functioning of markets. The European regulator 
recognized some causes for audit market concentration, identified a 
systemic risk and suggested joint audits and a mandatory rotation of audit 
firms to reduce concentration. Prominent concentration measures are 
concentration ratios, the Lorenz curve, the Gini-coefficient and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index. An empirical study on the concentration of 
German Prime Standard market for the period 2010 – 2013 revealed a high 
concentration which is quite stable over time and a narrow oligopoly with 
duopolistic tendencies. Nevertheless, competition could still work, e.g. due 
to the threat of market entrants. Moreover, given the fact that Big4 audit 
firms provide a higher audit quality, concentration may have positive 
effects. The mandatory audit firm rotation has a positive effect on auditor 
independence and a negative effect on auditor competence. This explains 
why related research output is inconclusive, i.e. the total effect on audit 
quality remains unclear. Moreover, a positive impact on competition is not 
ensured. Archival studies reveal that joint audits do not improve audit 
quality but increase audit costs. On the other hand, joint audits potentially 
reduce concentration. A combination between audit firm rotation and joint 
audits might be an optimal solution. 
